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Abstract- Cloud computing can be defined as management and 
provision of different resources, such as, software, applications 
and information as services over the cloud (internet) on 
demand. Cloud computing is based on the assumption that the 
information can be quickly and easily accessed via the 
net.  With its ability to provide dynamically scalable access for 
users, and the ability to share resources over the 
Internet, cloud computing has recently emerged as a promising 
hosting platform that performs an intelligent usage of a 
collection of services, applications, information and 
infrastructure comprised of pools of computers, networks, 
information and storage resources. Cloud computing is a 
multi-tenant resource sharing platform, which allows different 
service providers to deliver software as services in an 
economical way. Cloud computing is the latest technology 
revolution in terms of usage and management of IT resources 
and services driven largely by marketing and service offerings 
from the largest IT vendors including Google [26], IBM [19], 
Microsoft, and HP along with Amazon [17, 20, 24] and 
VMWare. However along with these advantages, storing a 
large amount of data including critical information on the 
cloud motivates highly skilled hackers, thus creating a need for 
the security is considered as one of the top issues while 
considering Cloud Computing. In this paper, we first explain 
the security model of cloud computing, and then analyze the 
feasibility, threats, and security in cloud computing in terms of 
extensive existing methods to control them along with their 
pros and cons. After that, the related open research problems 
and challenges are explored to promote the development of 
cloud computing.  
Keywords- Cloud Computing; Fault Tolerance; Security And 
Privacy; Services 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing is the collection of virtualized and 
scalable resources, the capability of hosting application and 
providing required services to the users with the “pay only 
for use” strategy, where the users pay only for the number 
of service units they consume. Cloud computing can be 
defined as the provision of computing services via the 
Internet such as [7]: Applications (software-as-a-service, or 
SaaS), Platforms, Infrastructure (IaaS), and Process 
orchestration and integration. 
Cloud computing refers to the delivery of computing and 
storage capacity [42] as a service to a heterogeneous 
community of end-recipients. The name comes from the use 
of clouds as an abstraction for the complex infrastructure it 
contains in system diagrams. Cloud computing entrusts 
services with a user's data, software and computation over a 
network [41]. It has considerable overlap with software as a 
service (SaaS) [1-5, 30].  
This next subsection explains the five essential 
characteristics defined by NIST (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology) [30]. 
On-demand self-service: The on-demand self-service is 
defined as the service provided by cloud computing vendors 
that enables the provision of cloud resources on demand 
whenever they are required [1]. 
Broad network access [2]: The cloud computing 
provides the access to the various resources in the world via 
broad network access [40], including both wired, fiber and 
wireless networks [46]. 
Resource pooling [3]: It is generally considered as a pool 
of resources such as assets, equipment, personnel, effort, 
etc., for the purposes of maximizing advantage and/or 
minimizing risk to the users. 
Rapid elasticity [4]: It is defined as the rapid ability to 
scale resources both up and down as needed. To the 
consumer, the cloud appears to be infinite, and the consumer 
can purchase as much or as little computing power as they 
need [44]. Defined by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) as one of the five essential 
characteristics of cloud computing. 
Measured service [5]: Cloud systems automatically 
control and optimize resource use by leveraging a metering 
capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the 
type of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and 
active user accounts). Resource usage can be monitored, 
controlled, and reported, providing transparency for both the 
provider and consumer of the utilized service.    
The main contributions of this paper are as follows: we 
first introduce the user to the concept of cloud computing by 
discussing the various essential characteristics, and then the 
architecture of cloud computing is described. After that, we 
discuss the various advantages and threats [32], the various 
security aspects [43], and the various security architecture of 
cloud computing. Finally, the open challenges of cloud 
computing [22] are explored. This paper focus on exploring 
and analyzing new findings, which include new 
technological developments as well as new understandings 
in the field of cloud computing. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
explains the security architecture of cloud computing. In 
Section 3, we first describe the feasibility of cloud 
computing wherein the various advantages of cloud 
computing are weighed against the obstacles and threats, 
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and then the various cloud computing threats and the 
various security aspects are identified from various 
scholarly articles. Section 4 explains the various solutions 
that are proposed for existing threats, the solution 
architecture and pros and cons of each solution. In Section 5, 
the paper explains the open research problems and 
challenges of Cloud Computing. Finally, we conclude our 
work. 
II. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
Security is an important issue concerning the cloud 
computing. Obviously It is no secret that cloud computing is 
becoming more and more popular today and is ever 
increasing in popularity with large companies as they share 
valuable resources in a cost effective way, and there is an 
ever growing threat of security becoming a major issue [38]. 
This paper shall look at ways in which security threats can 
be a danger to cloud computing and how they can be 
avoided [34]. Chen et al. [35] had examined contemporary 
and historical perspectives, and argued that few cloud 
computing security issues are fundamentally new or 
fundamentally intractable as well as that two facets are to 
some degree new and fundamental to cloud computing: the 
complexities of multi-party trust considerations, and the 
ensuing need for mutual auditability. 
Figure 1 shows the open secure architecture of cloud 
computing. The Open Security Architecture cloud-
computing pattern [23, 33] is a proposed to illustrate core 
cloud functions, the key roles for oversight and risk 
mitigation, and collaboration across various internal 
organizations, and the controls that require additional 
emphasis. The various controls in this architecture are as 
follows. 
- SA-1/4/5 System and Services Acquisition: ensure 
that acquisition of services is managed correctly. 
- CP-1 (Contingency Planning): ensure a clear 
understanding of how to respond in the event of 
interruptions to service delivery. 
- Risk Assessments controls: helps to understand the 
risks associated with services in a business context 
[25]. 
The pattern also provides a view into activities that are 
shared by security architects, security managers, and 
business managers. They should 
• Agree on the control baseline applicable to this 
cloud sourcing activity/service. 
• Confirm how this translates into the control 
framework of the cloud provider. 
• Decide on additional risk mitigating controls.
 
Figure 1. Cloud Computing Model - Open Secure Architecture [33] 
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There are a number of key control areas that should be 
considered carefully before moving the computing 
operations to cloud services: contractual agreements, 
certification and third-party audits, compliance requirements, 
availability, reliability, and resilience, backup and recovery, 
service levels and performance, decommissioning. If the 
process is comprised of a number of cloud services, then 
supporting services such as security, load monitoring & 
testing and provisioning and configuration management are 
required.  
The important entities involved in the data flow are end 
users, developers, system architect, third party auditors and 
the cloud itself [4]. 
• End Users. End Users need to access certain 
resources in the cloud and should be aware of access 
agreements such as acceptable use or conflict of 
interest. In this model, end user signatures may be 
used to confirm someone is committed to such 
policies. The client organization should run 
mechanisms to detect vulnerable code or protocols 
at entry points. 
• System Architects. System architects are employed 
with writing the policies that pertain to the 
installation and configuration of hardware 
components and software. They designate control 
protocols to direct the information flow within the 
cloud. 
• Developers. Cloud computing can improve 
software development by scaling the software 
environment through elasticity of resources. The 
cloud also helps developers create multiple 
evaluation versions environments for their 
applications, bypassing the need to incorporate 
additional security within the application and 
placing the burden on the cloud provider. Software 
monitoring may be done by monitoring API calls 
for server requests. Security patches for the software 
as service approach, updating a patch is easier done 
in the cloud and shared with everyone seamlessly. 
• Third Party Auditors. Third party auditors are 
used by clients and providers alike to determine the 
security of the cloud implementation. Depending on 
the level of commitment to security and usefulness 
in obtaining a competitive edge, a cloud vendor may 
choose to submit itself to regular security 
assessments in an attempt to obtain accreditation. 
III. FEASIBILITY, THREATS, AND SECURITY OF CLOUD 
COMPUTING 
This section analyzes the feasibility, threats, and security 
issues of Cloud Computing. 
A.  Feasibility of Cloud Computing 
a) Advantages of cloud computing  
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources that can be provisioned 
and released with minimal management effort or service 
provider interaction [30]. This section explains the various 
advantages of cloud computing [1, 12] 
• Virtualization.  The main advantage of cloud 
computing is Virtualization which is decoupling and 
separation of the business service from the 
infrastructure needed to run it.  
•  Flexibility to choose vendor. Cloud computing 
provides flexibility to choose among multiple 
vendors that provide reliable and scalable business 
services, development environments, and 
infrastructure that can be leveraged out of the box 
and billed on a metered basis—with no long term 
contracts.  
•  Elasticity. Elastic nature of the infrastructure 
allows rapidly allocating and de-allocating 
massively scalable resources to business services on 
a demand basis.  
• Cost Reduction. Reduced costs due to operational 
efficiencies, and more rapid deployment of new 
business services. Cloud computing is particularly 
attractive to businesses in times of financial 
recession and credit squeezes, because using cloud 
services enables them to substitute capital 
expenditure on hardware and software to meet their 
worst-case computing requirements with operating 
expenditure that relates to the amount of computing 
that they actually use. 
• Appearance of infinite computing resources on 
demand. 
• Elimination of an up-front commitment by Cloud 
users. 
• Ability to pay for use of computing resources on a 
short-term basis as needed. 
• Economies of scale due to very large data centers 
[42]. 
• Higher utilization by multiplexing of workloads 
from different organizations. 
• Simplify operation and increase utilization via 
resource virtualization. 
b) Obstacles and Opportunities for Growth of Cloud 
Computing  
The following table shows the main obstacles and 
opportunities for the growth of cloud computing as 
explained in the paper “A View of Cloud Computing” [12]. 
TABLE 1. OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
No OBSTACLE OPPORTUNITIES 
1 
Availability/Business 
Continuity 
 
Use Multiple Cloud Providers 
2 Data Lock-In 
Standardize APIs; Compatible SW 
to enable Surge or Hybrid Cloud 
Computing 
 
3 Data Confidentiality and Deploy Encryption, VLANs, 
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Auditability 
 
Firewalls 
4 Data Transfer Bottlenecks  
FedExing Disks; Higher BW 
Switches 
5 
Performance 
Unpredictability 
 
Improved VM Support; Flash 
Memory; Gang Schedule VMs 
6 Scalable Storage  Invent Scalable Store 
7 
Bugs in Large Distributed 
Systems 
 
Invent Debugger that relies 
on Distributed VMs 
8 Scaling Quickly 
Invent Auto-Scalar that relies on 
ML; Snapshots 
for Conservation 
9 Reputation Fate Sharing Offer reputation-guarding services like those for email 
10 Software Licensing Pay-for-use licenses 
 
Despite of these obstacles as well as opportunities and 
advantages, cloud computing raises several security issues 
and hence security is still the primary concern of many 
customers who want to leverage public cloud services. 
B. Cloud Computing Security Threats 
Security is one of the major issues, which reduces the 
growth of cloud computing and complications with data 
privacy and data protection continue to plague the market 
[39, 48]. The advent of an advanced model should not 
negotiate with the required functionalities and capabilities 
present in the current model [36]. In this section we describe 
the threats appearing in the cloud computing. 
Top seven security threats: Top seven security threats to 
cloud computing discovered by “Cloud Security Alliance” 
(CSA) are [21, 32]. 
1. Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing 
2. Insecure Application Programming Interfaces 
3. Malicious Insiders 
4. Shared Technology Vulnerabilities 
5. Data Loss/Leakage 
6. Account, Service & Traffic Hijacking 
7. Unknown Risk Profile 
Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing [1]: 
Abuse and nefarious use of cloud computing is the top 
threat identified by the CSA. A simple example of this is the 
use of botnets to spread spam and malware. Attackers can 
infiltrate a public cloud, for example, and find a way to 
upload malware to thousands of computers and use the 
power of the cloud infrastructure to attack other machines. 
Suggested remedies by the CSA to lessen this threat:  
• Stricter initial registration and validation processes. 
• Enhanced credit card fraud monitoring and 
coordination. 
• Comprehensive introspection of customer network 
traffic. 
• Monitoring public blacklists for one’s own network 
blocks. 
Insecure Application Programming Interfaces [2]: As 
software interfaces or APIs are what customers use to 
interact with cloud services, those must have extremely 
secure authentication, access control, encryption and activity 
monitoring mechanisms - especially when third parties start 
to build on them.  
Suggested remedies by CSA to lessen this threat: 
• Analyze the security model of cloud provider 
interfaces. 
• Ensure strong authentication and access controls are 
implemented in concert with encrypted transmission. 
• Understand the dependency chain associated with 
the API. 
Malicious Insiders [3]: The malicious insider threat is 
one that gains in importance as many providers still don't 
reveal how they hire people, how they grant them access to 
assets or how they monitor them. Transparency is, in this 
case, vital to a secure cloud offering, along with compliance 
reporting and breach notification. 
Suggested remedies by CSA to lessen this threat: 
• Enforce strict supply chain management and 
conduct a comprehensive supplier assessment. 
• Specify human resource requirements as part of 
legal contracts. 
• Require transparency into overall information 
security and management practices, as well as 
compliance reporting. 
• Determine security breach notification processes. 
Shared Technology Vulnerabilities [4]: Sharing 
infrastructure is a way of life for IaaS providers. 
Unfortunately, the components on which this infrastructure 
is based were not designed for that. To ensure that 
customers don't thread on each other's "territory", 
monitoring and strong compartmentalization is required. 
Suggested remedies by CSA to lessen this threat: 
• Implement security best practices for 
installation/configuration. 
• Monitor environment for unauthorized 
changes/activity. 
• Promote strong authentication and access control for 
administrative access and operations. 
• Enforce service level agreements for patching and 
vulnerability remediation. 
• Conduct vulnerability scanning and configuration 
audits. 
Data Loss/Leakage [5]: Be it by deletion without a 
backup, by loss of the encoding key or by unauthorized 
access, data is always in danger of being lost or stolen. This 
is one of the top concerns for businesses, because they not 
only stand to lose their reputation, but are also obligated by 
law to keep it safe [18]. 
Suggested remedies by CSA to lessen this threat: 
• Implement strong API access control. 
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• Encrypt and protect integrity of data in transit. 
• Analyze data protection at both design and run time. 
• Implement strong key generation, storage and 
management, and destruction practices [49]. 
• Contractually demand providers to wipe persistent 
media before it is released into the pool. 
• Contractually specify provider backup and retention 
strategies. 
Account, Service & Traffic Hijacking [6]: Account 
service and traffic hijacking is another issue that cloud users 
need to be aware of. These threats range from man-in-the-
middle attacks, to phishing and spam campaigns, to denial-
of-service attacks. 
Suggested remedies by CSA to lessen this threat: 
• Prohibit the sharing of account credentials between 
users and services. 
• Leverage strong two-factor authentication 
techniques where possible. 
• Employ proactive monitoring to detect unauthorized 
activity. 
• Understand cloud provider security policies and 
SLAs. 
Unknown Risk Profile [7]: Security should always in the 
upper portion of the priority list. Code updates, security 
practices, vulnerability profiles, intrusion attempts - all 
things that should always be kept in mind.  
Suggested remedies by CSA to lessen this threat: 
• Disclosure of applicable logs and data. 
• Partial/full disclosure of infrastructure details (e.g., 
patch levels, firewalls, etc.). 
• Monitoring and alerting on necessary information. 
Multiple security technology combination [49]: Existing 
work on cloud security mainly focuses on cloud storage or 
Traffic Hijacking without taking computation security into 
consideration. [49] proposes a novel auditing scheme 
(SecCloud) to secure cloud computing based on 
probabilistic sampling schemes as well as designated 
verifier technique, which aims to consider multiple factors 
together: secure data storage, computation and privacy 
preserving. They also discuss how to optimize sampling size 
to minimize the auditing cost and finally get good service 
performance [48]. 
C. Security and Privacy in cloud computing  
The security issue can be discussed in various layers of 
the cloud computing model. In this section, we have 
explained various security issues of cloud computing and 
how it can be addressed [31]. 
• Infrastructure Security. Infrastructure security can 
be ensured by addressing the threats at various 
levels namely network level, host level and 
application level. The security challenges at various 
levels are not specifically caused by cloud 
computing instead are exacerbated by its use. The 
issues of infrastructure security and cloud 
computing can be addressed by clearly defining 
trust boundaries by understanding which party 
provides which part of security [27]. 
• Data Security and Storage. Data security is a 
significant task, with a lot of complexity. Methods 
of data protection, such as redaction, truncations, 
obfuscation, and others, should be viewed with great 
concern. Not only are there no accepted standards 
for these alternative methods, but also there are no 
programs to validate the implementations of 
whatever could possibly be developed. 
Homomorphic encryption can be used for data 
security encryption. But with this approach key 
management is a problem. 
• Identity and Access Management (IAM). The key 
critical success factor to managing identities at 
cloud providers is to have a robust federated identity 
management architecture and strategy internal to the 
organization. Using cloud-based “Identity as a 
Service” providers may be a useful tool for 
outsourcing some identity management capabilities 
and facilitating federated identity management with 
cloud providers [8]. Enterprises should prepare with 
an IAM strategy and architecture that allows them 
to extend their IAM practice using standard 
protocols, such as SAML, SPML, and XACML, to 
manage user account provisioning, authentication, 
and authorization in the cloud 
• Security Management. From a security 
management perspective, a key issue is the lack of 
enterprise-grade access management features. The 
scope of security management of cloud services will 
vary with the service delivery model, provider 
capabilities, and maturity. Customers will have to 
make trade-offs with respect to the flexibility and 
control offered by the SPI services. The more 
flexible the service, the more control you can 
exercise on the service, and with that come 
additional security management responsibilities. In 
a virtualized environment where infrastructure is 
shared across multiple tenants, your data is 
commingled with that of other customers at every 
phase of the life cycle—during transit, processing, 
and storage. Hence, it is important to understand the 
location of the service, service-level guarantees such 
as inter-node communication, and storage access 
(read and write) latency. 
• Audit and Compliance. A programmatic approach 
to monitoring and compliance will help prepare 
CSPs (Cloud Service Provider) and their users to 
address emerging requirements and the evolution of 
cloud business models. To drive efficiency, risk 
management, and compliance, CSPs need to 
implement a strong internal control monitoring 
function coupled with a robust external audit 
process. To gain comfort over their in-cloud 
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activities, CSP users need to define their control 
requirements, understand their CSP’s internal 
control monitoring processes, analyze relevant 
external audit reports, and properly execute their 
responsibilities as CSP users. 
• Security-as-a service [43]. Security-as-a-service is 
likely to see significant future growth for two 
reasons. First, a continuing shift in information 
security work from in-house to out-sourced will 
continue. Second, several other information security 
needs are present for organizations currently, but 
they will accelerate in need and complexity with the 
growing adoption of cloud computing [28]. The two 
proactive controls are important to the growth of 
cloud computing: identity management that is inter-
cloud and scalable to the cloud size, and (encryption) 
key management. The two reactive controls are 
needed for audit and compliance purposes as well: 
scalable and effective SIEM, and data leakage 
prevention (DLP). Providing solutions to each of 
these controls will be difficult and requires 
significant complexity that must be hugely scalable 
and yet easy to use. 
• Privacy. The paper “Taking Account of Privacy 
when Designing Cloud Computing Services [9]” 
explains the various privacy challenges that are 
faced when cloud is used as production environment 
and also provides key design principles to address 
these issues. 
Privacy is an important issue for cloud computing, both 
in terms of legal compliance and user trust and this need to 
be considered at every phase of design. Maintaining the 
levels of protection of data and privacy required by current 
legislation in cloud computing infrastructure is a new 
challenge, as is meeting the restrictions on cross-border data 
transfer [28]. As cloud services process users’ data on 
machines that the users do not own or operate, this 
introduces privacy issues and can lessen users’ control. 
a) Privacy Challenge 
The key challenge for software engineers to design 
cloud services in such a way as to decrease privacy risk and 
to ensure legal compliance [25]. As with security, it is 
necessary to design in privacy from the outset, and not just 
bolt on privacy mechanisms at a later stage. 
It is also important to allay users’ fears about usage of 
cloud services. Concerns arise when it is not clear to 
individuals why their personal information is requested or 
how it will be used or passed on to other parties: this lack of 
control leads to suspicion and ultimately distrust. There are 
also security-related concerns about whether the personal 
data in the cloud will be adequately protected. 
Information that needs protection: The following types 
of information are privacy sensitive and hence needs to be 
protected. 
• Personally identifiable information (PII): any 
information that could be used to identify or locate 
an individual (e.g. name, address) or information 
that can be correlated with other information to 
identify an individual (e.g. credit card number, 
postal code, Internet Protocol (IP) address). 
• Sensitive information: information on religion or 
race, health, sexual orientation, union membership 
or other information that is considered private. Such 
information requires additional safeguards. Other 
information that may be considered sensitive 
includes personal financial information and job 
performance information. 
• Information considered being sensitive PII, e.g. 
biometric information or collections of surveillance 
camera images in public places. 
• Usage data: Usage data collected from computer 
devices such as printers; behavioral information 
such as viewing habits for digital content, users' 
recently visited websites or product usage history. 
• Unique device identities: Other types of 
information that might be uniquely traceable to a 
user device, e.g. IP addresses, Radio Frequency 
Identity (RFID) tags, unique hardware identities. 
b) Privacy threats and risks of cloud computing 
Privacy risks for cloud computing: The main privacy 
risks are: 
• For the cloud service user: being forced or 
persuaded to be tracked or give personal 
information against their will, or in a way in which 
they feel uncomfortable. 
• For the organization using the cloud service: non 
compliance to enterprise policies and legislation, 
loss of reputation and credibility. 
• For implementers of cloud platforms: exposure of 
sensitive information stored on the platforms 
(potentially for fraudulent purposes), legal liability, 
loss of reputation and credibility, lack of user trust 
and take-up [27]. 
• For providers of applications on top of cloud 
platforms: legal non compliance, loss of reputation, 
‘function creep’ using the personal information 
stored on the cloud, i.e. it might later be used for 
purposes other than the original cloud service 
intention. 
• For the data subject: exposure of personal 
information. 
Key privacy requirement: 
• Notice, openness and transparency. Anyone who 
wants to collect users’ information must tell them 
what they want to collect, how they want to use it, 
how long they will keep it, with whom they will 
share it, and any other uses they intend for the 
information. They must also notify users if they 
want to make a change in how the information is 
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used. If information is to be passed on to third 
parties, this also has to be notified. Personal 
information must be collected directly from the 
person unless there are very good reasons why this 
is not possible. Privacy policies must be made 
available to clients, and be understandable [22]. 
• Choice, consent and control. Users must be given 
the choice of whether they want this information to 
be collected or not. Data subjects must give their 
consent to the collection, use and disclosure of their 
PII. 
• Scope/minimization. Only information that is 
required to fulfill the stated purpose should be 
collected or shared. The collection of data should be 
minimized. 
• Access and accuracy. Users must be able to get 
access to personal information, to see what is being 
held about them, and to check its accuracy. Every 
effort must be made to ensure that the personal 
information held is accurate. 
• Security safeguards. Safeguards must prevent 
unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use or 
modification of PII 
• (Challenging) compliance. Clients must be able to 
challenge an agency’s privacy process. Transactions 
must be compliant to privacy legislation. One aspect 
of this is respecting cross border transfer obligations. 
• Purpose. Data usage has to be limited to the 
purpose for which it was collected. There must be a 
clearly specified purpose for the collection and 
sharing of personal information. Data subjects 
should be told why their data is being collected and 
shared at or before the time of collection. 
• Limiting use – disclosure and retention. Data can 
only be used or disclosed for the purpose for which 
it was collected and should only be divulged to 
those parties authorized to receive it. Personal data 
should be aggregated or anonymized wherever 
possible to limit the potential for compute matching 
of records. Personal information should only be kept 
as long as is necessary. 
• Accountability. An organization must appoint 
someone to ensure that privacy policies and 
practices are followed. Audit functions must be 
present to monitor all data accesses and 
modifications. 
c) Guidelines while designing the cloud 
1. Carry out a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA): PIA 
assesses the privacy requirements of new and existing 
systems; it is primarily intended for use in public sector risk 
management, but is increasingly seen to be of value to 
private sector businesses that process personal data. A 
Privacy Impact Assessment should be initiated early in the 
design phase, and its output fed into the design process in an 
iterative manner. 
2. Assess at different phases of design: Differing 
privacy requirements need to be considered according to 
the product lifecycle stage, namely: 
 Initiation: setting high level recommendations 
 Planning: describing privacy requirements in 
detail 
 Execution: identifying problems relating to the 
privacy solutions which have been proposed, 
considering alternative solutions if necessary, and 
documenting issues and any privacy exposures 
 Closure: using audit and change control 
procedures in the production environment; 
considering privacy protection during backup, fault 
repair, business continuity and disaster recovery 
 Decommission: ensuring secure deletion and 
disposal of personal and sensitive information 
3. Use Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) 
whenever appropriate: Privacy Enhancing Technology can 
be broadly thought as any technology that exists to protect 
or enhance individual’s privacy, including facilitating 
individuals’ access to their rights under the Data Protection 
Act 1998. For example privacy management tools that 
enable inspection of service-side polices about the handling 
of personal data 
Recommended privacy practices: The following tips are 
recommended for cloud system designers, architects, 
developers and Testers. 
Minimize personal information sent to and stored in the 
cloud 
• Protect personal information in the cloud 
• Maximize user control 
• Allow user choice 
• Specify and limit the purpose of data usage 
• Provide feedback 
d) Open issues 
There are still many open issues exist in the field of 
cloud computing. Some of them are covered below. 
• Policy enforcement within the cloud could prove 
very challenging. 
• It may only be possible to determine that data 
processing takes place somewhere within the cloud, 
and not the specific places where this takes place. 
• It may be difficult to determine the processors of 
data – for example, if subcontractors are involved. 
• It may be difficult at the outset of the design of a 
cloud computing service to know exactly how the 
later evolutions of that service will turn out. In 
particular, cloud computing is subject to a paradigm 
shift in user requirements from traditional 
approaches, in the sense that a full design 
specification in advance is not always appropriate, 
and user requirements need to be tested more 
frequently. Therefore, methodologies such as Agile 
software development may be particularly relevant. 
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IV. EXISTING SOLUTIONS TO CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY 
THREATS 
In this section we will discuss some of the existing 
solutions to the security threats mentioned in the above 
section and also discuss few of the pros and cons in them. 
A. Mirage Image Management System  
Mirage Image Management System [13] addresses the 
security related risks associated with Virtual Machine image 
sharing that are faced by image publishers, image retrievers 
and administrators of the cloud repository. This new image 
management system proposed in the paper “Managing 
security of virtual machine images in a cloud environment” 
controls access to images, tracks the provenance of images, 
and provides users and administrators with efficient image 
filters and scanners that detect and repair security violations. 
One of the security problem associated with cloud 
computing is secure management of the virtual-machine 
images that encapsulate each application of the cloud. The 
initial state of each virtual machine in the cloud is 
determined by these images and hence these images have 
high integrity. Users must be able to share images safely. 
Users should also be able to use the images built by the third 
parties.  
A cloud provides three types of resources: 
 A collection of virtual machine (VM) images 
 A set of computer servers on which the VM images 
can be run 
 A storage pool to store persistent user data 
optionally. 
The security and integrity of VM images are the 
foundation for the overall security of the cloud since many 
of them are designed to be shared by different and often 
unrelated users. 
a) Security Risks in an Image Repository 
Cost reduction in cloud computing is achieved by 
sharing the knowledge of how to manage a piece of IT asset 
via VM images. Thus VM image sharing is one of the 
fundamental underpinnings of cloud computing. 
VM image sharing unavoidably introduces security risks. 
• Security concerns from the perspective of owner:  
The publisher, or owner, of an image is the one who 
contributes the original image to the repository. She is 
mostly concerned about confidentiality 
• Security concern from the perspective of consumer: 
The retriever, or consumer, of an image is the one who 
retrieves the image from the repository and runs it on 
the compute servers. She is mostly concerned about 
safety 
• Security concern from the perspective of 
administrator: The administrator is concerned with the 
security and compliance of the cloud system as a whole 
and the integrity of individual images. The 
administrator assumes the liability of potential damages 
caused by malware contained in any image stored in the 
repository. 
• Publisher’s Risk. By publishing an image, the 
publisher risks releasing sensitive information 
inadvertently. Although traditional software publishers 
run similar risks, the problem is larger for image 
publishers because images contain installed and fully 
configured applications: the configuration might require 
dangerous operations like creating password-protected 
user accounts and, if the publisher sets up the 
application by running an instance of the image, she 
may unwittingly create files that should not be made 
public. The publisher may want to share her image with 
only a limited set of users. Therefore, the store should 
support some form of access control for images. 
• Retriever’s Risk. The retriever risks running 
vulnerable or malicious images introduced into the 
repository by a publisher. Virtual machine image 
sharing provides an easier way of developing and 
propagating Trojan horses. Using a virtual machine 
image as a carrier for the Trojan horse makes the 
hacker's job easier, because the virtual machine image 
encapsulates all software dependencies of the Trojan 
horse. The retriever also risks running illegal software 
contained in the image. 
• Repository Administrator’s Risk. The repository 
administrator risks hosting and distributing images that 
contain malicious or illegal content. The security level 
of a dormant VM image is not constant and degrades 
over time, because vulnerability may be unknown when 
the VM image is initially published but become known 
and exploitable later. Administrators carry a latent 
security risk that stems from long-lived but inactive 
images. As the number of VM images grows, so does 
the risk and along with it the cost of maintenance. 
b) Mirage Image Management System 
 
Figure 2. Architecture of Mirage Image Management System. 
Figure 2 shows the architecture of Mirage Image 
Management System. Mirage Image Management System 
consists of 4 major components: 
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• An access control framework that regulates the 
sharing of VM images, 
• Filters that remove unwanted information from 
images at publish and retrieval time,  
• A provenance tracking mechanism that tracks the 
derivation history of an image, and  
• Repository maintenance services, such as periodic 
virus scanning, that detect and fix vulnerabilities 
discovered after images are published. 
A detailed explanation of these components is given 
below. 
• Access Control. Each image in the repository has a 
unique owner, who can share images with trusted 
parties by granting access permissions. All other 
operations on an image, such as granting and 
revoking access to the image, require the operator to 
be the owner. By default an image is private, 
meaning that no one but the owner and the 
administrator can access the image. 
• Image Transformation by Running Filters. 
Filters at publish time can remove or hide sensitive 
information from the publisher's original image. 
Two types of filters can be applied at publish time: 
repository- specific filters and user-specific filters. 
Repository-specific filters are system-wide filters 
that reflect security best practices. Some of them are 
mandatory and some of them are optional. The 
publisher can specify the composition of the 
optional filters. User-specific filters are intended to 
remove or hide user-specific sensitive content from 
the images. For the safety of the repository, user-
supplied filters are never executable code. Instead, 
they are high-level specifications of transformation 
rules that are interpreted by the repository. The 
order in which filters are applied matters. For 
example if the user-specific filters were allowed to 
run after critical repository-specific filters, they 
could invalidate the latter's guarantees. Filters can 
also be applied at retrieve time. Such filters may be 
specified by the publisher or the retriever. 
• Provenance Tracking. The image management 
system tracks the derivation history of an image by 
recording the parent image information when a new 
image is deposited into the repository, along with 
the information about the operation that resulted in 
the creation of the new image. The provenance 
information is used in two ways. It can be consumed 
by an audit system to trace the introduction of 
illegal or malicious content. It can also be used to 
alert the owners of derived images when the parent 
image is patched, so that the derived images can be 
patched as well. Although not a security feature, the 
provenance information can also be displayed to the 
end user for her to visually inspect the derivation 
history of her images. 
• Image Maintenance. Repository provides a set of 
maintenance services that can be efficiently run over 
the entire repository.  Example maintenance 
services include malware detectors (e.g., virus 
scanners), license compliance managers, and 
security patches. 
c) Advantages: 
• Filters mitigate the risk in a systematic and efficient 
way.  
• The system stores all the revisions which allows the 
user to go back to the previous version if the current 
version if she desires. 
• The default access permission for an image is 
private so that only owner and system administrator 
can access the image and hence untrusted parties 
cannot access the image. 
d) Limitations: 
• Filters cannot always be 100% accurate, since what 
constitutes illegal or private content is highly 
application dependent. This system does not 
eliminate that risk entirely, but it does mitigate the 
risk, in a systematic and efficient way. 
• By the same token, virus scanning does not 
guarantee to find all malware in an image. 
• Using simple pattern matching to support user-
specific filters may render the resulting VM image 
unusable in some cases. 
• It may seem counter intuitive, but "the ability to 
monitor or control customer content" might increase 
the liability of the repository provider 
B. A Client-Based Privacy Manager  
The paper “A Client-Based Privacy Manager for Cloud 
Computing” [11] provides a client-based privacy manager 
that helps reduce the risk of data leakage and loss of privacy 
of the sensitive data processed in the cloud, and that 
provides additional privacy-related benefits 
a) Requirements 
A client based privacy manager should meet the 
following set of requirements that arise from privacy 
legislation. 
R1. Minimization of personal and sensitive data used 
and stored within the cloud infrastructure. 
R2. Security protection of data used and stored 
within the cloud infrastructure [29]: safeguards must 
prevent unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use or 
modification of personal information. 
R3. Purpose limitation: data usage within the cloud has 
to be limited to the purpose for which it was collected and 
should only be divulged to those parties authorized to 
receive it. 
R4. User centric design: the user should be given 
choice about whether or not his information is collected to 
be used within the cloud, his consent should be solicited 
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over the gathering and usage of such information and he 
should be given control over the collection, usage and 
disclosure of personal and sensitive information. 
R5. User feedback: notice about data collection should 
be provided to the user about what information will be 
collected, how it will be used, how long it will be stored in 
the cloud, etc. and there should be transparency about how 
personal information that is collected is going to be used 
within the cloud. 
b) Privacy Manager Architecture 
Figure 3 shows the overall architecture of the privacy 
manager.  
Features of Privacy Manager: The typical features of 
the privacy manager include: 
1. Obfuscation 
2. Preference setting 
3. Data Access 
4.  Feedback 
5. Personae 
 
Figure 3. Overview of Privacy Manager 
• Obfuscation. Privacy Manager provides 
obfuscation and de-obfuscation of data. This feature 
can automatically obfuscate some or all of the fields 
in a data structure before it is sent off to the cloud 
for processing, and translate the output from the 
cloud back into de-obfuscated form. The 
obfuscation and de-obfuscation is done using a key 
which is chosen by the user and not revealed to 
cloud service providers. This feature meets the data 
minimization requirement (R1) of privacy 
legislation. 
• Preference setting. This is a method for allowing 
users to set their preferences about the handling of 
personal data that is stored in an un-obfuscated form 
within the cloud. Unlike the obfuscation feature, this 
feature is only useful if there is a corresponding 
policy enforcement mechanism within the cloud. 
This feature along with its server side components 
addresses Purpose limitation requirement (R3) of 
privacy legislation. This feature allows the user 
greater control over the usage of his data, and the 
personae feature makes this more intuitive. Hence 
the design is user centric thus satisfying the 
requirement R4 of privacy legislation. 
• Data Access. The Privacy Manager contains a 
module that allows users to access personal 
information in the cloud, in order to see what is 
being held about them, and to check its accuracy. 
This is essentially an auditing mechanism which 
will detect privacy violations once they have 
happened, rather than a mechanism to prevent 
violations from happening in the first place. The 
service providers need to be able to make this 
information accessible to the user. This module 
enables, organizes and logs this access on the client 
machine.  
• Feedback. The Feedback module manages and 
displays feedback to the user regarding usage of his 
personal information, including notification of data 
usage in the cloud. This module could monitor 
personal data that is transferred from the platform. 
This feature along with data access feature satisfies 
the feedback requirement (R5) of the privacy 
legislation.  
• Personae. This feature allows the user to choose 
between multiple personae when interacting with 
cloud services. The user’s choice of persona may 
drive the strength of obfuscation that is used. 
This architecture assumes that access control, etc. will 
be deployed on the services side in order to protect any data 
stored within the cloud. 
c) Typical Problems Solved by Privacy Manager 
1. Sales force automation 
• Problem. For the cloud services, the business 
uploads its sales data to databases on 
Salesforce.com’s computers. Detailed sales data is 
generally commercially sensitive – businesses are 
not willing to share it with their competitors – and 
in many cases will also contain individual 
information about the customers who have made 
purchases, such as their email addresses and product 
preferences. The security threat in this scenario is 
the theft of sales data from the service provider’s 
system, followed by possible resale to business 
competitors or identity thieves. 
• Solution. Figure 4 shows the process of using a 
cloud service with obfuscation to find the address of 
the customer who has spent most on CoolWidgets. 
An enterprise sales rep wants to find the email 
address of the customer who has spent most on the 
CoolWidget product. His client runs Privacy 
Manager software, whose integrity is protected by a 
Trusted Platform Module. The obfuscation feature 
of the Privacy Manager obfuscates his query, and 
sends the result to a cloud-based application for 
sales force automation, running on the service 
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provider’s hardware. The application consults the 
obfuscated sales database for the enterprise and 
sends back an answer. The answer is in obfuscated 
form: the software de-obfuscates it to reveal the 
required email address.  
 
Figure 4.  Using a cloud service with obfuscation to find the   address of the 
customer who has spent most on CoolWidgets. 
2. Customized End-User Services 
Problem. Information may be automatically gathered 
about end-user context and user data in the cloud assessed, 
in order to provide targeted end user services. 
The main threats in this type of scenario involve: 
• Personal information about a user being collected, 
used, stored and/or propagated in a way that would 
not be in accordance with the wishes of this user. 
• ·  People getting inappropriate or unauthorized 
access to personal data in the cloud by taking 
advantage of certain vulnerabilities, such as lack of 
access control enforcement, data being exposed ‘in 
clear’, policies being changeable by unauthorized 
entities, or uncontrolled and/or unprotected copies 
of data being spread within the cloud. 
• Legal non-compliance. In particular, restrictions on 
trans-border data flow may apply, and also some of 
the data may be of types subject to additional 
regulations. 
Solution. In this scenario, the user sets his preferences at 
to the treatment of personal data using the Preference setting 
feature of the privacy manager. The Privacy Manager can 
use this preference information to determine the appropriate 
degree of obfuscation to be carried out on the data. 
The user’s preferences are sent by the Privacy Manager 
on the client to a service-side component which governs 
enforcement of the policies. The service-side component 
ensures that these preferences remain attached to any 
personal information stored, used and shared in the cloud, 
and follow that data if it were transferred or propagated, 
preventing it being used in any way that is not compatible 
with that policy and thereby ensuring that the user has 
control over the usage of his data. 
3. Share Portfolio Calculation 
Problem. The application is the calculation of the 
current value of a user’s share portfolio. The threat in this 
scenario is a leak of information about the user’s share 
ownership from the service provider’s system, followed by 
possible misuse. 
Solution. For this scenario it is possible to use 
obfuscation to protect information about the user’s share 
ownership from being misused. The client constructs two 
different portfolios such that the true portfolio is some linear 
combination of these. The client sends the two portfolios to 
the application separately, as the obfuscated input data. 
When the user wishes to know the current value of his 
portfolio, the client sends a request for the current value of 
each of the two of portfolios in the obfuscated data. It then 
combines the two answers from the cloud using the linear 
equation to obtain the current value of the user’s portfolio. 
The unobfuscated data describing the user’s true 
portfolio is never present in the service provider’s system.  
So it cannot leak from this system, even if the service 
provider is malicious. 
d) When the solution is not applicable 
A user with data x and a service provider with data y 
could use Yao’s protocol for secure two-party computation  
to enable the user to learn f(x,y) without the service provider 
learning x or the user learning y, where f is any polynomial-
time functionality. The implementation of Yao’s protocol on 
a large data set x in general may require the user to have a 
rather large amount of storage and computation power. For 
users with limited computing resources there is thus a 
tradeoff between the extent to which data is obfuscated and 
the set of applications that can effectively be used, even 
when the service provider gives full cooperation. If the 
service provider cooperates then the other features of 
Privacy Manager can still be used. 
If the service provider does not provide full cooperation 
the features of the Privacy Manager other than obfuscation 
will not be effective, since they require the honest 
cooperation of the service provider. 
The ability to use obfuscation without any cooperation 
from the service provider depends not only on the user 
having sufficient computing resources to carry out the 
obfuscation and deobfuscation, but also on the application 
having been implemented in such a way that it will work 
with obfuscation. 
C. Transparent Cloud Protection System (TCPS)  
The paper “Transparent Security for Cloud” [15] 
discusses the integrity protection problem in the clouds and 
sketches a novel architecture, Transparent Cloud Protection 
System (TCPS) for increased security of cloud resources.  
a) Requirements 
The core set of requirements to be met by a security 
monitoring system for clouds is the following 
 Effectiveness: the system should be able to detect 
most kinds of attacks. 
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 Guest Maintenance Tolerance: the system should 
be able to (ideally) avoid false-positives. 
 Transparency: the system should minimize 
visibility from VMs. 
 Immunity to attacks from the Guest: the host 
system and the sibling guests should be protected 
from attacks proceeding from a compromised guest. 
 Deployability: the system should be installable on 
the vast majority of available middleware. 
 Dynamic Reaction: the system should detect an 
intrusion attempt over a guest and, if required by the 
security policy, take appropriate actions against the 
attempt or against the compromised guest and/or 
notify remote middleware security-management 
components. 
b) The Transparent Cloud Protection System (TCPS) 
 
Figure 5: Cloud layers and Examples 
Figure 5 shows the various cloud layers. The 
Transparent Cloud Protection System (TCPS) is a 
middleware whose core is located between the Kernel and 
the virtualization layer. TCPS is intended to protect the 
integrity of guest VMs and of the distributed computing 
middleware by allowing the host to monitor guest VMs and 
infrastructure components. 
TCPS Architecture: Figure 6 shows the architecture of 
TCPS. TCPS is a protection system for clouds aimed at 
transparently monitoring the integrity of cloud components. 
TCPS is transparent to guest machines: it is hard to attack 
even from a compromised or untrusted VM and can inspect 
guest status and data.  In Transparent Cloud Protection 
System (TCPS), a middleware whose core is located 
between the Kernel and the virtualization layer is intended 
to protect the integrity of guest VMs and of the distributed 
computing middleware by allowing the host to monitor 
guest VMs and infrastructure components. TCPS is a pure 
host side architecture and this allows deploying unmodified 
guest virtual appliances. Key components that would be 
affected by attacks are monitored to protect VMs and cloud 
infrastructure [29]. By either actively or passively 
monitoring such key kernel and cloud components any 
possible modification to kernel data and code can be 
detected, thus guaranteeing that kernel and cloud 
middleware integrity has not been compromised and 
consequently no attacker has made its way into the system. 
To monitor accesses to cloud entry points the integrity of 
cloud components can be checked via periodic checksum. 
 
Figure 6: TCPS Architecture Continuous lines: potentially dangerous data 
flows Dashed lines: monitoring data flows 
All TCPS modules reside on the Host and Qemu is 
leveraged to access the guest. Suspicious guest activity can 
be noticed by the Interceptor and they are recorded by the 
Warning Recorder into the Warning Queue where the 
potential alteration will be evaluated by the Detector 
component. TCPS can locally react to security breaches or 
notify the distributed computing security components of 
such an occurrence. In order to avoid false positives as 
much as possible, an administrator can notify TCPS of the 
new components' checksum. 
Advantages: TCPS can be tailored to different cloud 
middleware implementations and can monitor cloud 
components integrity. This allows increased protection from 
most kind of attacks in a way that is completely transparent 
to guest VMs. 
D. Secure and Efficient Access to Outsourced Data  
The paper “Secure and Efficient Access to Outsourced 
Data” [10] proposes a mechanism to solve the problem of 
providing secure and efficient access to large scale 
outsourced data in owner-write-users-read applications.  
This method uses over-encryption and/or lazy revocation to 
prevent revoked users from getting access to updated data 
blocks. This mechanism handles both updates to outsourced 
data and changes in user access rights. 
a) Problem Definition 
Application Scenario and Basic Assumptions. The 
data owner stores a large amount of information on the 
service provider. Since the service provider is untrusted, the 
owner will encrypt the outsourced data before putting them 
on the server. To provide fine-grained access control, the 
encryption will be conducted at the block level. Only the 
owner can make updates to the outsourced data. Here the 
operations include updates to data blocks, and deletion, 
insertion, and appending of blocks. The outsourced data can 
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be accessed by many different end users that are distributed 
all over the network. Computationally expensive operations 
on the data blocks should be avoided and also the amount of 
information that is stored on the end users must be reduced. 
The access rights of the end users are different and they may 
change (grant and revocation) as time proceeds. Therefore, 
right keys must be provided to the end users to control their 
access. 
An end user will send a data access request to the owner. 
The owner will refer to its access control matrix and send 
back corresponding encryption keys through the secure 
channel between them. At the same time, the owner will 
send back a data access certificate to the end user. The user 
will then present the certificate to the service provider. The 
provider will verify it and send the corresponding encrypted 
data blocks to the end user. 
More Assumptions 
 The smallest information access unit is called a 
`block'. 
 There exist pre-distributed secrets between data 
owner and service provider, and between data 
owner and end-users. 
 The service provider adopts a curious but not 
malicious model. That means, the provider will not 
intentionally send wrong data blocks to an end user 
but it will try to get access to the plaintext of the 
stored information. 
 
Figure 7.  Illustration of Application Scenario 
System Requirements: 
 The outsourced data could be huge and the service 
provider may charge the owner based on used space. 
 In addition to providing the storage space, the 
service provider may or may not offer the service of 
over-encryption when it sends the data blocks to end 
users. 
 Since the service provider may have a pay-per-use 
pricing policy, the data owner should reduce the 
number of information accesses to the service 
provider when they are not caused by updates to 
data block 
 Reduce the storage, communication, and 
computation overhead on the data owner and end 
users to promote the wide adoption of the proposed 
approach. 
b) Secure and efficient data access 
Determining keys for data encryption: An efficient 
mechanism must be designed to allow data owner and end 
users to manage the encryption keys. The key derivation 
method is being chosen. This method generates the data 
block encryption keys through a hierarchy. Every key in the 
hierarchy can be derived by combining its parent node and 
some public information. Since the derivation procedure 
uses a one-way function, the secret keys of the parent node 
and the sibling nodes cannot be calculated. Hence the data 
owner will need to maintain only the root nodes of the 
hierarchies. During the key distribution procedure, the 
owner can send the secrets in the hierarchy to end users 
based on their access rights. The end user will derive the 
leaf nodes in the hierarchy to decrypt the data blocks. The 
cost of this approach is the calculation of one-way functions 
during key derivation. Figure 8 shows the key derivation 
hierarchy. 
There are various issues that need attention. 
 When choosing the height of the hierarchy, there 
should be some room for the insertion and 
appending operations to the outsourced data. 
 Encryption keys of the blocks that are temporarily 
missing from the outsourced data should not be 
disclosed.  
 
Figure 8.  Key Derivation Hierarchy 
Data Access Procedure:  
Symbols used in the procedure 
• O: data owner 
• S: service provider 
• U: end user.  
• kOU and kOS  :  pair wise keys shared by O  with U 
and S respectively. 
Procedure: 
1. U will send a data access request to O. 
U -> O: {U, O, EKou, (U, O, request index, data block 
indexes, MAC code)} 
The request index will be increased by 1 every time U 
sends out a request and it is used by O to defend against 
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replay attacks. The request contains the index numbers of 
the data blocks that U wants to access. The Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) will protect the integrity of the 
packet. 
2.   When O receives this message, it will authenticate 
the sender and verify the integrity and freshness of the 
request. 
It will then examine its access control matrix and make 
sure that U is authorized to read all blocks in the request. If 
the request passes this check, the owner will determine the 
smallest set of keys K’ in the hierarchy such that (1) K’ can 
derive the keys that are used to encrypt the requested data 
blocks; and (2) U is authorized to know all keys that can be 
derived from K’. K’ can be determined by a greedy 
algorithm and we ignore its details here. 
The owner will then generate the reply to the end user. 
O-> U: { U, O, EKou, (O, U, request index, ACM index, 
seed for P(), K|, cert for S, MAC code)} 
Here the request index is used to uniquely label this 
reply. The ACM index is used by O to label the freshness of 
the Access Control Matrix (ACM). This index will be 
increased by 1 every time O changes some end user's access 
rights. 
The updated ACM index will be sent to S by O to 
prevent those revoked users from using old certificates to 
access data blocks. The seed is a random number to initiate 
P() so that U can decrypt the over-encryption conducted by 
S. U will use K’  to derive the data block encryption keys. 
The cert in the packet is a certificate for the service provider 
and it has the following format: 
{EKos, (U, request index, ACM index, seed, indexes of 
data blocks, MAC code)} 
3.  The user U will send {U, S, request index, cert} to 
the service provider. When S receives this packet, it can 
verify that O generates the cert, since only they know the 
secret kOS. S will make sure that the user name and request 
index in cert match the values in the packet. If the ACM 
index in cert is smaller than the value that S receives from O, 
some changes to the access control matrix have happened 
and S will notify U to get a new cert. Otherwise, the service 
provider will retrieve the encrypted data blocks and conduct 
the over-encryption as follows. Using seed as the initial 
state of P(), the function will generate a long sequence of 
pseudo random bits. S will use this bit sequence as one-time 
pad and conduct the xor operation to the encrypted blocks. 
The computation results will then be sent to U. 
4. When U receives the data blocks, it will use seed to 
generate the pseudo random bit sequence and use K’ to 
derive the encryption keys. It will then recover the data 
blocks. 
Advantages: 
 Reduces the overhead of the data owner 
 Prevent revoked users from getting access to the 
outsourced data 
c) Handling Dynamics in System 
Dynamics in user Access Rights: 
• Grant Access Right. When an end user U is 
authorized to read a data block Di, the owner will 
change its access control matrix and increase the 
value of ACM index. The next time that U submits a 
data access request, the owner will recalculate the 
key set. K’ based on the new access rights. The 
service provider and the end user do not need to 
change to adapt to this update. 
• Revoke Access Right. When the access right to 
data blocks Di of the user U is revoked, the access 
control matrix in O will be updated and the ACM 
index increased. At the same time, O will label this 
data block to show that some user's access right has 
been revoked since its last content update. Before Di 
is updated for the next time, the owner will not 
change the block on the outsourced storage. When 
the owner needs to change the data block from Di to 
D’i, it will check the label and find that some user's 
access right has been revoked. Therefore, it cannot 
encrypt the updated data block with the current key. 
To solve this problem, the owner will encrypt a 
control block with the secret kp,i and put it at the 
slot for Di. The control block will contain a pointer 
to another block in which the updated data is stored. 
It will also contain enough information for the 
owner to derive the new encryption key. The owner 
will derive the new key and send it back to the user. 
At the same time, a new cert will be generated so 
that the user can get the new block from the service 
provider. A revoked user will be able to get access 
to the control block. 
Dynamics in Outsourced Data: 
• Block Deletion. When a data block Di is deleted 
from the outsourced data, the owner will use a 
special control block to replace Di. The special 
block will be encrypted by kp,i and stored at the 
original slot for Di on the service provider. At the 
same time, the owner will label its access control 
matrix to show that the block no longer exists. The 
end users can still access this control block but they 
will not get any useful information from the 
contents. 
• Block Update. If no user's access right to this data 
block has been revoked since its last update, the 
owner can update its value in the current storage 
place. The owner will first locate the slot in which 
Di is currently stored and derive its encryption key. 
It will then use the key to encrypt D’i and write the 
new value to the storage place. The end users will 
not be impacted by this operation and they will 
automatically get the new data when they access the 
block. 
If some user's access right to Di has been revoked since 
its last update and the service provider refuses to conduct 
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over- encryption during data transmission, we cannot 
encrypt the new block D’i with the current key. On the 
contrary, we will encrypt a control block with kp,i and write 
it to the i-th block of the outsourced data. The control block 
will contain the following information: (1) a pointer to the 
data block in which D’i is currently stored; (2) information 
used by the data owner to derive the encryption key of D’i ; 
(3) information used by the data owner to verify the 
integrity of the control block. The owner will also use the 
new secret to encrypt D0i and write it to the corresponding 
place in S. 
When a user needs to access D’i, it will get the 
encrypted control block from the service provider and 
submit it to the owner. The owner will verify the 
authenticity and integrity of the control block and derive the 
current encryption key. It will then return the key with a cert 
to the user through a secure channel so that the user can 
access D’i from S. A revoked user can get the control block 
but it will not get the new encryption key and the cert. 
• Block insertion and Appending. The data owner 
may need to generate new information and put it on 
the outsourced storage. Here we do not intentionally 
distinguish insertion from appending and follow the 
same procedure to handle the two operations. The 
data owner will locate an unused block index, derive 
the encryption key in the hierarchy using k0,1, 
encrypt the data block, and store it on the service 
provider. 
Advantages: 
• Data access procedure reduces the overhead of the 
data owner and prevents the revoked users from 
getting access to the outsourced data.  
• This approach is robust against collusive attacks if 
the hash function is safe.  
• Over-encryption conducted by the service provider 
defends against eavesdroppers even when they have 
the data block encryption keys. 
• This approach has less communication and 
overhead for data retrieval when they have 
infrequent update operations.  
• This approach handles user revocation without 
impacting service provider. 
Disadvantages:  
• This approach is applicable only for owner-write-
users-read applications and hence not generic.  
• There is a lengthened data retrieval delay caused by 
the access to updated data blocks.  
Security of the Approach: 
 The adversaries have to have a non-negligible 
advantage in breaking the hash function to 
accomplish this task. Therefore, the proposed 
approach is robust against collusive attacks if the 
hash function is considered safe. 
 To defend against the replay attack, the data owner 
must verify the freshness of the control block. 
 Over-encryption conducted by the service provider 
can defend against eavesdroppers even when they 
have the data block encryption keys. 
E. Securing Elastic Applications on Mobile Devices for 
Cloud Computing  
The paper “Securing Elastic Applications on Mobile 
Devices for Cloud Computing” [16] gives an overview of 
how elastic applications work and some features of the 
elasticity framework, and focus on the security issues in 
designing elastic applications. 
a) Overview of elastic application for mobile devices: 
 Figure 9 shows the overview of elastic application for 
mobile device. An elastic application can consist of one or 
more weblets, which function independently, but 
communicate with each other. When the application is 
launched, an elasticity manager running on the device 
monitors the resource requirements of the weblets of the 
application, and make decisions where they should be 
launched. 
 
Figure 9.  Overview of elastic application for mobile device. 
If one weblet should be launched on the cloud, the 
elasticity manager talks to elasticity service residing on the 
cloud, which arranges the execution resources of the weblet. 
The service also returns some information after successfully 
launching the weblet, such as its endpoint URL. The 
elasticity manager can also make decisions about migrating 
running weblets from the device to cloud or from cloud to 
device, according to changes in computing constraints on 
the device or changes in user preferences. During execution, 
the weblets of a single application can communicate with 
each other, with an RPC mechanism or RESTful web 
services. The elasticity service organizes cloud resources 
and delegates application requirements from mobile devices. 
Challenges: 
 A new application model is needed in order to 
launch or migrate some parts of an application in the 
cloud and others on the device. The new application 
model should support applications partitioned into 
multiple components, each of which can run 
autonomously from the others. 
 An appropriate protocol is needed between weblets 
during runtime 
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 A set of cost objective functions are needed, which 
should be optimized when elastic scheduling 
decisions are made 
 Security and privacy are important factors when 
considering some sensitive weblets and data 
migrating from device to cloud. 
b) Elastic Applications for Mobile Platform 
Concept and Benefits: The objective of an elastic 
application is to dynamically leverage cloud computing for 
resource-constrained mobile devices. An elastic device 
should have the ability to migrate functionality between the 
device and cloud. This ability allows the device to adapt to 
different work loads, performance goals, and network 
latencies. 
Benefits: 
 Elastic applications need not be constrained by the 
current compute capabilities of mobile devices. If 
more compute (or storage) is needed then this can 
be obtained from the cloud. As devices become 
more powerful, compute and storage can shift back 
to the device 
 Device resources can be modest since the more 
demanding applications can acquire resources from 
the cloud. 
 The ability to allocate resources in the cloud and 
migrate functionality gives the device great 
flexibility. 
 Application components that are partitioned for 
migration can also be replicated. The failure then of 
one instance of a replicated component need not 
compromise the application [37]. 
Elastic Framework Architecture: 
 
Figure 10: Elastic framework architecture 
Figure 10 shows the architecture of an elastic framework.  
• Device Elasticity Manager (DEM): DEM is 
responsible for configuring applications at launch 
time and making configuration changes during run 
time. The elasticity manager maintains a cost model 
which accounts the various monetary costs. The 
elasticity manager runs an optimizer which is 
responsible for determining the best application 
configuration given costs and user goals. The router 
passes requests from UI components to weblets. It 
insulates the UI logic from weblet location. The 
sensing data of each device is made available to the 
elasticity manager and is used by the cost model. 
• Cloud elasticity service (CES): CES consists of 
cloud manager, application manager, and sensing 
information collection. Cloud manager which 
maintains the usage information is responsible for 
allocating resources from, and releasing to, the 
underlying cloud platform. The application manager 
provides functions to install and maintain 
applications on behalf of elastic devices, and helps 
to launch weblets in different cloud nodes. CES 
provides a web service, referred to as the cloud 
fabric interface (CFI) to elastic devices and 
applications. 
• Node manager: A node manager on each node 
oversees resources associated with a particular node 
(server) within the cloud. It communicates directly 
with the cloud manager and application manager. 
Each node runs one or more weblet containers 
which are the weblet runtime environments hosted 
on the cloud platform. 
Elastic Application Model: 
• Partitions of an elastic application: Each 
application should be partitioned into components 
called weblets.  
• Data dependency of weblets: An elastic 
application should allow reasonable data 
dependency between weblets of the same 
application or different applications. 
• Communication protocols between weblets: As 
an elastic application is naturally distributed 
between the cloud platform and a mobile device, 
weblets should communicate with each other.  
c) Security Assumptions, Threats and Requirements 
Security Assumptions: 
• As part of the elastic framework the elasticity 
manager on each device is trusted. 
• CES is trusted including cloud manager, application 
manager, cloud node manager, and CFI. 
Threat Model: 
There various types of threats are: 
1. Threats to Mobile Devices: Malware targeting 
mobile devices have become prevalent. Some of the attack 
include: 
• Attacks on integrity and confidentiality of 
application code and user data on a device 
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• drain power on the device by changing the 
configuration of an application 
• Attack on device’s sensing components could cause 
the DEM to manage weblets based on incorrect data. 
• Malware could bypass the elasticity manager and 
launch weblets on cloud platforms on behalf of the 
user, which would be billed to the user’s account. 
2. Threats to Cloud Platform and Application 
Container: 
• Malicious entities can change network and cost 
settings, or even cloud sensing information to 
confuse the CES into making decisions such as 
using overly expensive network connections to 
devices. 
• Consume resources of cloud platform could lead to 
degradation of performance and network bandwidth 
of the cloud platform and generate hidden bills to 
the application user. 
3. Threats to Communication Channels [45] 
• Attacker can sit in the middle of the network and 
generate tremendous network traffic to both sides 
• DDoS attacks can not only exhaust bandwidth 
resources, but also result in excessive charges to 
user accounts or disable them if they exceed their 
quotas. 
Security Objectives: 
• Trustworthy weblet containers (or VMs) on both 
device and cloud: Weblets must be installed and 
execute in trusted runtime environments in all 
locations. The elasticity manager on both the cloud 
and device should have some assurance that the 
weblet’s execution environment can adequately 
protect its expected functionalities. 
• Authentication and secure session management: 
The elastic framework should provide a mechanism 
to authenticate weblets belonging to the same 
application and user to each other. This is especially 
important when they are running on different 
platforms 
• Authorization and access control: A weblet on the 
cloud should adhere to the property of least 
privileges. 
• Logging and auditing: Behaviors of weblets 
should be logged and audited routinely to prevent 
malicious activities. 
d) Authentication and Secure Session Management 
Secure Installation of Elastic Applications: When a user 
downloads and installs an application, the integrity of all 
weblets are verified by the installer of the elastic device by 
re-computing and comparing their hashes and with those in 
the bundle. 
After successful integrity verification, the installer 
registers the application with the DEM. The DEM maintains 
a table of installed applications on the device which need 
elasticity manager support, each with detailed information 
of weblets. Parts of the elastic application can be installed 
by the application manager into the CES. To do this, the 
user has to register and authenticate with the CES during 
installation. The cloud-based application manager also can 
download the same application from an application store 
instead of uploading from the device. 
Building Authentication between Weblets: 
 Whenever an elastic application wants to launch a 
weblet, it first connects to the DEM, which decides 
where to launch the weblet. 
 DEM generates a pair of weblet session keys (wsk) 
and a secret (wss) for the application if this is the 
first weblet to be launched. These are shared by all 
weblets during a single session. 
  When DEM decides to launch a weblet in local 
device, it executes the installed weblet binary with 
LaunchWeblet (localhost,wid,wss,wsk). Upon 
invoking, the weblet construction method records 
wid, wsk, and wss into its member variables. Also, 
the weblet returns a valid URL endpoint which is 
used to communicate with other weblets with http(s). 
DEM then updates a weblet table which records the 
active weblet’s URL, wid, and wsk. 
  If DEM decides to launch a weblet in a cloud, it 
calls the CFI’s web method 
LaunchWeblet(cfi,wid,wsk,wss). 
 Based on its service logic, the CFI queries its cloud 
manger and decides on which cloud node the weblet 
will be loaded. Once this is decided, CFI call the 
target node manager’s LaunchWeblet(nodeid, wid, 
wsk,wss), again with https as it goes via public 
Internet. 
  The node manager executes weblet binaries 
provided by the application manager of the CES. A 
code transportation mechanism is needed between 
the node manager and CES. The successfully 
launched weblet returns a valid URL endpoint to the 
node manager, which in turn is passed back to CFI 
and DEM. DEM updates the weblet table with 
returned result. Before updating, DEM verifies if the 
WebletOK message is generated by the launched 
weblet, by checking the HMAC value with wss. 
 A local weblet can query DEM to obtain the list of 
all active weblets in the same session by call 
DEM::GetWeblet(wsk). DEM returns the URLs of 
all weblets by querying the table. 
 The local weblet can broadcast the URLs to any 
other weblet that needs to communicate.  
Security Analysis: 
 Only weblets and the DEM know about wss, which 
reduces the risk of a compromised CES and node 
managers using the secret 
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 Communication between weblets are authenticated 
by the shared secret, and identified by the session 
token 
Secure Migration: 
 Usually a migration request is triggered by the DEM. 
 Upon this request, the weblet enters a migration 
state and saves its current running state including its 
session secret 
 Weblet returns to DEM. 
 The DEM then sends the migration request to the 
CFI. 
 CFI then decides where the weblet should be 
migrated, by either picking one cloud node in an 
available node pool or creating a new node. 
 Node Manager launches new weblet with the state 
of migrating weblet from device. 
 To make this migrated weblet visible to other 
weblets, the node manager updates its new URL to 
the routing table on the device after successful 
migration, and the migrated weblet broadcasts its 
new URL to other weblets by querying the DEM. 
 
Figure 11 Secure weblet migration from device to cloud 
e) Authorization of Weblets. 
Various approaches: 
1. Shared user credentials: Each weblet has user 
credentials such as username and password or digital 
certificate of the web service. 
A method can be implemented by weblets to retrieve this 
via the UI component. 
Disadvantage: A hostile environment on cloud node can 
save the user credentials and impersonate the user later. 
2. Shared session information: After a device weblet 
authenticates with the web server, it shares ask and ass with 
other weblets. A method can be implemented by the weblet 
class to share or broadcast secret. 
Advantage: The session secret is only valid for a short 
time period after authentication and hence safer than the 
previous approach. 
3. Use session information only on device weblet: 
Whenever a cloud weblet needs access to user data on 
external web services, it forwards the requests to the 
authenticated device weblet, which has ask and ass 
Advantage: This approach enhances the security as 
session information is only available on the device. 
Disadvantage: Multiple re-directions are needed in this 
approach, thereby introducing communication overhead to 
the device. 
4. OAuth-like authentication: When the cloud weblet 
accesses the web service, it generates an authentication 
challenge on behalf of the user and redirects any responded 
authentication URL to the UI or device weblet. When the 
web server authenticates the user successfully, the UI or 
device weblet re-directs the resulting session information to 
the original requesting cloud weblet. 
Advantage: Fine-grained authorization is supported. 
Disadvantage: Extra authorization management should 
be considered in application logic, thus more burden for 
application developers. 
F. DDoS Defense in Cloud Computing 
Lacking trust between service providers and cloud users 
has hindered the universal acceptance of cloud computing as 
a service on demand. In the past, trust models have been 
developed to protect mainly e-commerce and on-line 
shopping provided by eBay and Amazon. For web and 
cloud services, trust and security become even more 
demanding, because leaving user applications completely to 
the cloud providers has faced strong resistance by most PC 
and server users. Cloud platforms become worrisome to 
some users for lack of privacy protection, security assurance, 
and copyright protection. Trust is a social problem, not a 
pure technical issue. However, the social problem can be 
solved with a technical approach. 
We desire a healthy cloud ecosystem that is free from 
abuses, violence, cheating, hacking, viruses, rumors, 
pornography, spasm, privacy and copyright violations. We 
assess the security demands of three cloud service models: 
IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS that have used in cloud practices. 
These models are based on various service level agreements 
(SLAs) between providers and users. 
There’re mainly three basic cloud security enforcements. 
Firstly, facility security in datacenters demands on-side 
security all year round. Biometric readers, CCTV (close-
circuit TV), motion detection, and man traps are often 
deployed. Secondly, network security demands fault-
tolerant external firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and 
third-party vulnerability assessment. Thirdly, platform 
security demands SSL and data decryption, strict password 
policies, system trust certification, etc. Servers in the cloud 
can be physical machines or virtual machines. User 
interfaces are applied to request services. The provisioning 
tool carves out the systems from the cloud to satisfy the 
requested service. A security-aware cloud architecture 
demands security enforcement. Malware-based attacks like 
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worms, viruses and DDoS exploit the system vulnerabilities. 
These attacks compromise the system functionalities or 
provide the intruders an unauthorized access to critical 
information. Thus, security defense is needed to protect all 
cluster servers and datacenters. 
Listed below are some cloud components that demand 
special security protection [51]: 
 Protection of servers from malicious software 
attacks like worms, viruses, and malwares. 
 Protection of hypervisors or VM monitors from 
software based attacks and vulnerabilities. 
 Protection of VMs and monitors from service 
disruption and denial of service attacks. 
 Protection of data and information from theft, 
corruption and natural disasters. 
 Providing authenticated and authorized access to 
critical data and services. 
A case study is Amazon Web Services (AWS) Elastic 
Compute Cloud (EC2). Amazon acknowledges that 
maintaining security and privacy in a cloud environment is 
more complex than when managing a single datacenter. 
Table 1 identifies 6 of our 20 security recommendations that 
Amazon has incorporated into their security models. 
"A 50 megabit/sec attack used to be a big deal. Now 
we're seeing 84 gigabits of sustained traffic. No enterprise 
on the planet can withstand the bandwidth capability for that 
attack," Petro says. "If you have a 10 megabit pipe, and you 
receive a 10.1 megabit attack, you're done. That's why 
DDoS has to be mitigated in the cloud." The survey found 
that DDoS attacks accounted for 33% of website downtime. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, more than two-thirds of 
respondents said their downtime impacted customers and 
half reported lost revenue as a result [55].  
Therefore, a DDoS defense system must be designed to 
cover multiple network domains spanned by a given cloud 
platform. These network domains cover the edge networks 
where the protected cloud resources are physically 
connected. DDoS attacks come with widespread worms. 
The flooding traffic is large enough to crash the victim 
server by buffer overflow, disk exhaustion, or connection 
saturation, etc. Figure 12 (a) shows a flooding attack pattern 
launched from 4 zombies towards a victim server attached at 
the bottom router R0. The flooding traffic flows essentially 
form a tree pattern as shown in Figure 12 (b). Successive 
attack-transit routers along the tree detect the abnormal 
surge of traffic at their I/O ports. This DDoS defense system 
is based on change-point detection along all attack-transit 
routers. The defense scheme works across multiple network 
domains. 
In a DDoS flooding attack, the attacker often recruits many 
zombies over the Internet. The flooding traffic flows 
through multiple AS (autonomous system) domains before 
reaching the edge network where the victim machine is 
attached. Routers at the upstream domains observe the 
suspicious traffic flows ahead of routers at the downstream 
domains. Figure 13 illustrates an example network covering 
six AS domains. The victim server is located in the AS1 
domain. Zombies are scattered widely in the Internet. By 
detecting abnormal traffic changes, the detection server at 
each domain creates a traffic flow subtree locally. 
TABLE 1 AWS SECURITY FEATURES ALIGNMENT WITH CLOUD SECURITY 
RECOMMENDATIONS [54] 
Recommendation Amazon implementation 
Do not implicitly trust the cloud or 
any instances in the cloud; every 
interaction in the cloud demands 
authorization and authentication 
Every AWS interaction requires a 
“signed” API call. 
Virtually “shred” retired 
instances and data when no longer 
needed 
When customer storage is no 
longer used, every 
block of data is automatically 
wiped. AWS 
also uses a proprietary disk 
virtualization 
layer to ensure customer data 
remains private 
when virtual disk blocks are 
returned to 
resource pool. 
Utilize a single management, 
logging, and monitoring system 
capable of supporting the entire 
cloud 
AWS utilizes bastion hosts for 
cloud management 
Restrict console access (physical 
and virtual) to users with a defined 
business need 
Administrative access, both 
physical and virtual, is strictly 
controlled according to legitimate 
business requirements. Those 
access privileges are immediately 
revoked when an employee no 
longer has a need for access. Each 
administrator is assigned unique 
cryptographically strong SSH 
keys. Access 
to bastion hosts is logged and 
audited on a regular basis. 
Provide centralized authentication 
and authorization services 
AWS utilizes bastion hosts for 
cloud management. 
Digitally sign control messages 
within the cloud in order to 
prevent tampering and 
unauthorized use 
Customers are issued a unique 
key. This key, or 
an authorized X.509 certificate, 
must be used to sign all Amazon 
EC2 API calls. Signing API calls 
ensures that control messages 
within the cloud are authorized 
and prevents tampering. API calls 
in transit are encrypted with SSL. 
 
Figure 12 DDoS attacks and defense by change-point detection at all 
routers on the flooding tree [52]. 
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Figure 13 Distributed defense against DDoS attacks over multiple network 
domains [53]. 
Multiple traffic subtrees are merged to form the global 
traffic flow tree. Once the global tree is detected at the end 
router, all servers in the covered domains will be alerted 
with the eminent DDoS attacks. The Packet dropping could 
stop attack from the suspected upstream routers beamed 
towards the victim. 
To sum up, the above defense system detects abnormal 
traffic changes at attack-transit routers. Based on the 
anomaly pattern detected in covered network domains, the 
scheme detects a DDoS attack before the victim is 
overwhelmed. The detection scheme is suitable for 
deployment at the cloud provider core networks. The 
provider-level cooperation eliminates the need of 
intervention by edge networks. Experimental results 
reported in [53] prove that 4 to 8 domains are sufficient to 
yield a 98% detection success rate of TCP SYN and UDP 
flooding attacks. Based on Internet AS domain distribution, 
the defense scheme can scale well to protect almost one 
hundred AS domains in a real-life Internet environment. 
VeriSign [56] has added an extra layer of security to the 
Internet's .com domain, but e-retailers, banks and other Web 
site operators will need to upgrade their DNS hardware, 
software or services to take advantage of .com's new 
cryptographic features. Verisign is expanding its cloud-
based DDoS protection service to cover small and midsize 
businesses that are increasingly frequent targets. Until now, 
Verisign has been offering a high-end DDoS protection 
service to major financial services firms. Now, Verisign is 
taking that same set of home-grown DDoS detection and 
mitigation tools to a broader market. 
Soon Hin Khor et al. [57] proposed DaaS, which is a 
service that protects a server against all 3 types of 
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS), arbitrary packet, 
legit user-mimicking and economic attacks. For arbitrary 
packet DDoS defense, DaaS's framework facilitates harness 
of intermediaries that relay traffic to a server so that their 
total resource exceeds those of DDoS bots. For legit user-
mimicking DDoS defense, DaaS's unique self-verifying 
Proof-of-Work (sPoW) empowers a sender to compete with 
bots by solving a more difficult sPoW puzzle to discover a 
more obscure "ephemeral" intermediary channel that has 
been designated to relay a single connection to its desired 
destination. For economic DDoS (eDDoS) defense, obscure 
ephemeral channels force bots to continuously expend 
resource to discover them before the bots can trigger 
channel utilization billing. Although neither intermediaries 
nor PoW is new, DaaS represents a leap forward for mainly 
two reasons. First, DaaS framework tackles the incentive 
issue of harnessing intermediary resource to a volume 
sufficient for arbitrary packet DDoS defense, an issue 
ignored by existing work. Second, sPoW protects against 
eDDoS, which conventional PoWs cannot, servers are billed, 
in principle, for only legitimate traffic relayed with bot 
traffic quietly discarded. 
In the paper [58], it explains how maneuver IT 
virtualization strategy could be used in responding to a 
denial of service attack. After picking up a grossly abnormal 
spike in inbound traffic, targeted applications could be 
immediately transferred to virtual machines hosted in 
another data center.  
Elastic cloud computing is an attractive proposition, 
such as Amazon EC2, which offers convenience in setup, 
on-demand capacity and a highly dependable computing 
platform with little maintenance requirement. However, a 
DDoS can rack up a cloud adopter’s utilization bill resulting 
in an economic DDoS (eDDoS)—a debilitating bill incurred 
by using highly elastic capacity to unwittingly serve a large 
amount of undesired traffic [59]. sPoW explores how to 
cobble an on-demand network and application-level eDDoS 
mitigation mechanism using existing cloud(s) to protect 
servers in clouds against eDDoS or even DDoS in general. 
Since cloud-based eDDoS mitigation mechanism itself, is 
susceptible to eDDoS, it is imperative to drop eDDoS traffic 
before it triggers the billing mechanism. In the paper [59], 
Soon Hin Khor et al. proposed two key ideas. The first one 
is that transform network level eDDoS into traffic that can 
be distinguished and filtered using basic packet pattern 
matching. The second one is that prioritize legitimate 
looking traffic, which is a mix of legitimate and application 
level DDoS traffic using capabilities and our self-verifying 
Proof of-Work (sPoW) scheme. The first one rids network-
level eDDoS before the billing perimeter, and the latter one 
reduces the number of application-level eDDoS connection 
requests thereby minimizing the portion of server utilization 
incurred by eDDoS but at the expense of protracted 
connection establishment time for legitimate clients. Neither 
proposed features, requires special technology on existing 
cloud platforms, make them deployable now. 
V. OPEN RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 
This section explains some other threats that are 
discovered in the Cloud Computing Journal “A security 
analysis of Cloud Computing” [5]. 
 Failures in Provider Security. 
In a cloud environment, all security depends on the 
security of the cloud provider. They control the 
hardware and the hypervisors on which data is 
stored and applications are run. Cloud provider 
security must be top-of-the-line. 
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 Attacks by Other Customers. 
The cloud environment is shared among customers. 
If the barriers between customers break down, one 
customer can access another customer's data or 
interfere with their applications. 
 Availability and Reliability Issues. 
Cloud data centers are generally as reliable as 
enterprise data centers or more so. However, 
outages do occur. Also, the cloud is only usable 
through the Internet so Internet reliability and 
availability is essential. 
 Legal and Regulatory Issues. 
The virtual, international nature of cloud computing 
raises many legal and regulatory issues. First, export 
of data out of a jurisdiction may be restricted. If 
such export is permitted, which jurisdiction's rules 
apply in case of conflict? And who is liable for 
errors such as security breaches? These issues must 
be addressed for any sensitive applications of cloud 
computing. 
 Perimeter Security Model Broken. 
Many organizations use a perimeter security model 
with strong security at the perimeter of the 
enterprise network. This model has been weakening 
over the years with outsourcing and a highly mobile 
workforce. Cloud computing strikes its death knell. 
The cloud is certainly outside the perimeter of 
enterprise control but it will now store critical data 
and applications.  
 Integrating Provider and Customer Security 
Systems. Enterprises have spent decades developing 
a unified directory and other components of their 
security architecture: automated provisioning, 
incident detection and response, etc. Cloud 
providers must integrate with these systems or the 
bad old days of manual provisioning and 
uncoordinated response will return. 
A. Fear of The Cloud  
Security concerns are categorized as [14]: 
• Traditional Security 
• Availability 
• Third-party data control 
a) Traditional Security 
These concerns involve computer and network 
intrusions or attacks that will be made possible or at least 
easier by moving to the cloud. 
Concerns in this category include 
 VM-level attacks. Potential vulnerabilities in the 
hypervisor or the VM technology used by the cloud 
vendors. 
 Cloud provider vulnerabilities. These could be 
platform-level, such as an SQL-injection or cross-
site scripting vulnerability in salesforce.com  
 Phishing cloud provider. Phishers and other social 
engineers have a new attack vector. 
 Expanded network attack surface. The cloud user 
must protect the infrastructure used to connect and 
interact with the cloud, a task complicated by the 
cloud being outside the firewall in many cases.   
 Authentication and Authorization. The enterprise 
authentication and authorization framework does 
not naturally extend into the cloud.  
 Forensics in the cloud. 
b) Availability 
These concerns center on critical applications and data 
being available. 
Concerns in this category include 
 Uptime. Besides just services and applications 
being down, this includes the concern that a third-
party cloud would not scale well enough to handle 
certain applications. 
 Single point of failure. Cloud services are thought 
of as providing more availability, but perhaps not – 
there are more single points of failure and attack 
[47].  
 Assurance of computational integrity.  
c) Third-party data control.  
    The legal implications of data and applications being 
held by a third party are complex and not well understood. 
There is also a potential lack of control and transparency 
when a third party holds the data. Concerns in this category 
include: 
 Due diligence 
 Auditability. Audit difficulty is another side effect 
of the lack of control in the cloud.  
 Contractual obligations. One problem with using 
another company's infrastructure besides the 
uncertain alignment of interests is that there might 
be surprising legal implications.  
 Cloud Provider Espionage. This is the worry of 
theft of company proprietary information by the 
cloud provider. 
 Data Lock-in. The data might itself be locked in a 
proprietary format, and there are also issues with 
training and processes.  
 Transitive nature. The contracted cloud provider 
might itself use subcontractors, over whom the 
cloud user has even less control, and who also must 
be trusted.  
B. New Problems  
This section explains some of the new problems areas in 
security that arise from cloud computing [14] 
• Cheap data and data analysis. Because of cloud 
computing collection and analysis of data is now 
possible cheaply. Because of the cloud, attackers 
potentially have massive, centralized databases 
available for analysis and also the raw computing 
power to mine these databases. Because of privacy 
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concerns, enterprises running clouds collecting data 
have felt increasing pressure to anonymize their data. 
• Cost-effective defense of availability. Availability 
also needs to be considered in the context of an 
adversary whose goals are simply to sabotage 
activities. Increasingly, such adversaries are 
becoming realistic as political conflict is taken onto 
the web. The cloud computing model encourages 
single points of failure. It is therefore important to 
develop methods for sustained availability, and for 
recovery from attack. 
• Increased authentication demands. The 
development of cloud computing may, in the 
extreme, allow the use of thin clients on the client 
side. Thin clients result in a number of opportunities 
related to security; - their security is managed by the 
cloud, which maintains the software they run. The 
movement towards increased hosting of data and 
applications in the cloud and lesser reliance on 
specific user machines is likely to increase the threat 
of phishing and other abusive technologies aimed at 
stealing access credentials, or otherwise derive them. 
• Mash-up authorization. As adoption of cloud 
computing grows, we are likely to see more and 
more services performing mash-ups of data. This 
development has potential security implications, 
both in terms of data leaks, and in terms of the 
number of sources of data a user may have to pull 
data from – this, in turn, places requirements on 
how access is authorized for reasons of usability. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We explored a lot of research articles about the cloud 
computing, including the advantages of cloud computing, 
risks in cloud computing and various approaches to solve 
those risks each with their pros and cons. Each algorithm is 
aimed at solving a particular risk. However cloud computing 
is still struggling in its infancy, with positive and negative 
comments made on its possible implementation for a large-
sized enterprise. IT technicians are spearheading the 
challenge and pursuing research to improve on its 
drawbacks. Several groups have recently been formed, such 
as the Cloud Security Alliance or the Open Cloud 
Consortium, with the goal of exploring the possibilities 
offered by cloud computing to establish a common language 
among different providers. Cloud computing is facing 
several issues in gaining recognition for its merits. Its 
security deficiencies and benefits need to be carefully 
weighed before we make a decision to implement it [4]. 
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